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Abstract
In this paper, we focus on a special framework for quantum coin flipping protocols, bit-commitment
based protocols, within which almost all known protocols fit. We show a lower bound of 1/16 for the
bias in any such protocol. We also analyse a sequence of multi-round protocol that tries to overcome
the drawbacks of the previously proposed protocols, in order to lower the bias. We show an intricate
cheating strategy for this sequence, which leads to a bias of 1/4. This indicates that a bias of 1/4 might
be optimal in such protocols, and also demonstrates that a cleverer proof technique may be required to
show this optimality.
1 Quantum coin flipping
Coin flipping is the communication problem in which two distrustful parties wish to agree on a common
random bit, by “talking over the phone” [5]. When the two parties follow a protocol honestly, the bit
they agree on is required to be 0 or 1 with equal probability. Ideally, they would also like that if any
(dishonest) party deviates from the protocol, they do not agree on any particular outcome with probability
more than 1/2. It is known that ideal coin flipping is impossible, in both, the classical and the quantum
setting [10, 11]. In fact, in any classical protocol, one of the two parties can force the outcome of the
protocol to a value of her choice with probability 1. In [1], Aharonov, Ta-Shma, Vazirani, and Yao showed
that it is possible to design a quantum coin flipping protocol in which no player can force the outcome of
the protocol with probability more than a constant 1/2 + ǫ, with bias a constant ǫ < 1/2. In other words,
any cheating player in such protocols is detected with constant probability. Later, Ambainis [2] gave an
improved protocol with bias at most 1/4.
Formally, a quantum coin flipping protocol with bias ǫ is a two-party communication game in the style
of [15], in which the players start with no inputs, and compute values cA, cB ∈ {0, 1} respectively (or
declare that the other player is cheating). The protocol satisfies the following additional properties:
1. If both players are honest (i.e., follow the protocol), then they agree on the outcome of the protocol:
cA = cB , and the outcome is 0 or 1 with equal probability: Pr(cA = cB = b) = 1/2, for b ∈ {0, 1}.
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2. If one of the players is honest (i.e., the other player may deviate arbitrarily from the protocol in his
or her local computation), then the outcome of the protocol has bias at most ǫ: for any b ∈ {0, 1},
Pr(cA = cB = b) ≤ 1/2 + ǫ.
Almost all quantum coin flipping protocols with bias that is provably smaller than a half [1, 2] are based
on the notion of bit-commitment. In other words, they have the following form, when the parties flipping
the coin, Alice and Bob, are honest.1
Protocol schema Π:
1. First, Alice and Bob each pick a random bit, a and b respectively, and privately construct states ρa
and σb. The states are over three sets of qubits, a commitment part, a revelation part, and a
verification part. The revelation part consists of one qubit that contains the value of the bit picked.
2. Next, they commit to their respective bits a and b, by sending each other the commitment part of
their states ρa and σb. They may do this over several rounds of communication, in which they send
messages alternately.
3. Then, they reveal to the other party the bits a, b they picked (in some order), and follow that up by
sending the rest of the states ρa, σb (the verification part). This may again be over several rounds of
communication. This allows the each party to check via suitable measurements that the state with
which the other, Alice (or Bob), committed to her (his) bit is indeed consistent with a (b).
The result of the protocol is c = a⊕ b, if neither player is detected cheating during the third (verification)
stage.
For example, in the case of the protocol in [2], Alice uses the right half of the following state to commit to
her bit a, and the left half to help Bob check her commitment:
ρa =
∑
s=0,1
1
2
|a, s〉〈a, s| ⊗ |ψa,s〉〈ψa,s|, where
|ψx,s〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + (−1)s|x+ 1〉).
Bob skips the commit stage, and directly reveals his bit b. In the final stage, Bob checks that the state of the
qutrit Alice sent in the first round is indeed consistent with a, s, by measuring it in a basis containing |ψa,s〉.
Protocols of the form described above may be recast in the following terms. First, Alice and Bob each
pick a random bit. Then, they successively send each other qubits which do not depend on the qubits sent
by the other party in the previous rounds. The qubits sent by Alice represent a commitment to her bit a
along with auxiliary information required by Bob to check if she is cheating. Similarly for the qubits sent
by Bob. Thus, after all communication is over, the states Alice and Bob sent to each other for 0 and 1
are perfectly distinguishable. They measure the states received from the other party (possibly with some
ancilla) according to a von Neumann measurement to determine the bits a, b or to detect cheating. The
outcome of the coin flip is a⊕b if no cheating is detected. In this description, we have assumed, w.l.o.g. [4],
that all measurements are done at the end. Note that the description is also slightly more general in that
the players may not explicitly reveal the bits they intend to commit to, and the commitment and the
1We were recently informed [13] of a protocol of a different kind that also achieves a bias of 1/4.
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verification stages may be interleaved. We will henceforth refer to such protocols as bit-commitment based
protocols.
In this paper, we study coin flipping protocols that fall into the special framework described above, that
of bit-commitment based protocols. We show a lower bound of 1/16 for the bias in any such protocol
(Theorem 2.2). This provides a single proof that these protocols, including the one proposed in [12],
cannot lead to arbitrarily small bias.
Next, we analyse a sequence of protocols that tries to overcome the drawbacks of the previously proposed
protocols, and also tries to circumvent the cheating strategy that leads to this above lower bound. We show
an intricate cheating strategy for the sequence of protocols, which leads to a bias of 1/4. This indicates
that a bias of 1/4 might be optimal in such protocols, and also demonstrates that a cleverer proof technique
than the one used in Theorem 2.2 is required to show this optimality.
Recently, Kitaev has shown a lower bound of 1/
√
2 − 1/2 = 0.2071 . . . for the bias in arbitrary quantum
coin flipping protocols [9]. This is bigger than the bias of 1/16 = 0.0625 that we show (and applies to any
coin-flipping protocol). Kitaev’s lower bound, however, doesn’t seem to apply to quantum games in which
the two parties involved compete to “win” by getting a particular value of the coin as the outcome (say
Alice wins if the outcome is 0, and Bob wins if the outcome is 1). This is also known as weak coin-flipping in
the literature. Protocols for weak coin-flipping with bias less than 1/4 have been discovered. Kerenidis and
Nayak [8] have shown a protocol with cheating probability at most 0.739 . . .. Ambainis [3], and Spekkens
and Rudolph [14] have shown protocols with an even lower cheating probability of at most 1/
√
2 = 0.707 . . ..
2 A lower bound on the bias
We first show that any bit-commitment based protocol may be reduced to an extremely simple protocol of
the same type, with bias at most that in the original protocol, and by increasing the number of rounds by
at most 1.
Lemma 2.1 For any bit-commitment based coin flipping protocol P (of the form Π, or more generally, as
described in Section 1), there is another such protocol P ′ such that
1. The states ρa, σb are pure: ρa = |ψa〉〈ψa| and σb = |φb〉〈φb|, where |ψ0〉 ⊥ |ψ1〉 and |φ0〉 ⊥ |φ1〉,
2. Alice measures the state she received from Bob according to the measurement given by the opera-
tors P0 = |φ0〉〈φ0|, P1 = |φ1〉〈φ1|, and Pc = I − P0 − P1, to determine Bob’s bit or to check if he
is cheating. Bob does an analogous measurement given by Q0, Q1, Qc on the state he receives from
Alice, and
3. The bias is at most the bias of P.
Proof: The protocol P ′ is obtained by stipulating that the players use a fixed purification |ψa〉, |φb〉 of
the states ρa, σb used in the original protocol P. Since the states ρ0, ρ1 are perfectly distinguishable, their
purifications are orthogonal. Similarly with φ0, φ1. All but the last two rounds of P ′ are as in the original
one. We stipulate that the players send the entire (purified) state ψa or φb in P ′. Thus, the last player to
send a message in P sends the qubits used in the purification in the penultimate round of P ′. In the final
round, the other player sends the qubits used in purifying her state. We also alter the measurement to the
ones mentioned in the lemma.
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We now show that this modification of the protocol results in bias at most that in the original one. We do
this by showing that any cheating strategy of a player in the modified protocol P ′ that achieves a bias of ǫ
leads to a cheating strategy in the original protocol P with at least the same bias.
For concreteness, we consider a cheating strategy for Alice in the protocol P ′. (The argument for the case
of Bob is similar.) In her strategy in P, Alice acts exactly as in the original strategy, except that she is
not required to send the “purification qubits” meant for her last message in P ′. We need only show that
the probability with which the measurement in P yields 0 or 1 dominates the same probability for P ′.
Suppose that Bob uses a von Neumann measurement given by the projection operators R0, R1, Rc in P.
We concentrate on the probability that Alice can convince Bob that she had picked a = 0. The other
probability may be bounded similarly. Since R0ρ0R0 = ρ0, the purification |ψ0〉 lies in the range of I⊗R0.
The states of the qubits sent to Bob by Alice and her private qubits in P ′ are together given by some
mixed state
∑
j µj|ξj〉〈ξj | (where the states |ξj〉 are over the space of ρa and the purification space). It thus
suffices to show that for any state |ξ〉 ∈ {|ξj〉},
‖ I ⊗R0|ξ〉 ‖2 ≥ |〈ψ0|ξ〉|2 .
Note that the LHS is the squared-norm of the projection of |ξ〉 onto the range of I ⊗ R0, and the RHS is
the squared-norm of the projection of the same vector onto a subspace of that range, the one-dimensional
space spanned by |ψ0〉. The inequality is then immediate. This shows that Alice can achieve at least the
same bias as in P ′.
This simple characterisation of bit-commitment based protocols proves useful in the analysis of the small-
est bias achievable with such protocols. Using this, we show that coin flipping protocols based on bit-
commitment cannot achieve arbitrarily small bias.
Theorem 2.2 In any quantum coin flipping protocol based on bit-commitment, one of the parties can
achieve probability of cheating at least 9/16.
Proof: As shown in Lemma 2.1, any such protocol between honest parties may be viewed as follows:
first, Alice and Bob construct the states |ψa〉 and |φb〉, respectively, corresponding to the random bits a
and b. Then, they send each other a part of the states |ψa〉, |φb〉 a few qubits at a time. Finally, they
measure the qubits received from each other using projections P0, P1, Pc and Q0, Q1, Qc.
Let ρa,i = TrAi(|ψa〉〈ψa|) be the state sent to Bob by Alice by round i (so Ai are the qubits of |ψa〉 still
with Alice after the i-th round). Let σb,i be the corresponding state sent to Alice by Bob.
Let there be n rounds in all. Let FA,i = F (ρ0,i, ρ1,i) and similarly FB,i = F (σ0,i, σ1,i). Here, F (·, ·) is fidelity
function as defined in [7]. So FA,0 = FB,0 = 1. Note that Qaρa,nQa = ρa,n, and similarly Pbσb,nPb = σb,n,
so that FA,n = FB,n = 0.
Lemma 2.3 Consider a protocol with honest players. For any constant 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, there is a player, say
Alice, and a round k ≥ 0 such that the states she sends to Bob by the k-th round on a = 0 and 1 have
fidelity at least α, and the fidelity of the states she receives from Bob by the next round have fidelity at
most α. In other words, FA,k ≥ α and FB,k+1 ≤ α.
Proof: The case α = 1 is trivial. Let α < 1. Note that both FA,i, FB,i decrease from 1 to 0 through
the course of the protocol. Consider the first round i ≥ 1 such that one of these, say FB,i, becomes ≤ α.
Round k = i− 1 satisfies the property we seek.
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We will devise a cheating strategy for a player as given by Lemma 2.3 above for α = 1/4. Say this player
is Alice, and the round identified in the lemma is k. There is a unitary transformation on the qubits Ak
which achieves maximum fidelity between ρ0,k, ρ1,k [7], i.e.,
|〈ψ0|U |ψ1〉|2 = FA,k = F (ρ0,k, ρ1,k) ≥ 1
4
.
Moreover, we may assume that 〈ψ0|U |ψ1〉 is real and non-negative.
Alice may cheat as follows. She constructs the state
|ξ〉 = |ψ0〉+ U |ψ1〉‖ψ0 + Uψ1 ‖
and uses this state in the protocol till round k+1. After this round, she makes the best possible measure-
ment to distinguish σ0,k+1 and σ1,k+1 to guess the value of b. If her guess g is 0, she proceeds with the
rest of the protocol, Otherwise, she applies U † to her part of |ξ〉 (the qubits in Ak) and then completes the
protocol.
Lemma 2.4 Pr(c = 0|g = b) ≥ 1+
√
FA,k
2 .
Proof: First, note that
‖ψ0 + Uψ1 ‖2 = ‖ψ0 ‖2 + ‖ψ1 ‖2 + 2〈ψ0|U |ψ1〉 = 2(1 +
√
FA,k).
Suppose b = 0. (The other case is similar.) Note that the probability that Alice succeeds in getting the
outcome c = 0 given that she guesses the value of b correctly is
‖Q0ξ ‖2 = ‖Q0ψ0 +Q0Uψ1 ‖
2
‖ψ0 + Uψ1 ‖2
=
‖Q0ψ0 ‖2 + ‖Q0Uψ1 ‖2 + 2〈ψ0|Q0U |ψ1〉
2(1 +
√
FA,k)
.
Now Q0|ψ0〉 = |ψ0〉, since |ψ0〉 is the state Alice would have used if she were honest. So the first term in
the numerator above is 1, and the last term is 2
√
FA,k. The second term may be bounded from below
by noting that since |ψ0〉 belongs to the range of Q0, the square-norm of the projection Q0U |ψ1〉 is at
least 〈ψ0|U |ψ1〉2 = FA,k. Thus, the probability of cheating is at least
1 + FA,k + 2
√
FA,k
2(1 +
√
FA,k)
=
1 +
√
FA,k
2
,
which is the bound claimed.
The probability that Alice correctly guesses b is (using Bayes’ strategy)
Pr(g = b) =
1
2
+
‖σ0,k+1 − σ1,k+1 ‖tr
4
.
By a result of Fuchs and van de Graaf [6],
‖σ0,k+1 − σ1,k+1 ‖tr ≥ 2(1−
√
FB,k+1) ≥ 2(1 − 1
2
) = 1.
The net probability that Alice succeeds in biasing the coin towards 0 is therefore
Pr(c = 0) ≥ Pr(c = 0|g = b) · Pr(g = b) ≥ 3
4
· 3
4
=
9
16
.
This proves the theorem.
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3 A sequence of highly interactive protocols
In this section we look at a sequence of bit-commitment based protocols in which Alice and Bob very
gradually send each other information about their bits in the commit stage. Intuitively, such protocols
seem to be good candidates for achieving bias much smaller than 1/4, since a dishonest player does not get
much information about the other’s bit until a significant number of rounds have elapsed, and he would
have heavily committed to some bit by then. However, this intuition appears to be mistaken, and we give
intricate cheating strategies for each of the players with which at least one of them can achieve bias at
least as high as 1/4. This suggests that the optimal bias for this kind of protocol might be 1/4, and also
that proving this optimality might require ideas more sophisticated than those in Theorem 2.2.
Define, for x, s ∈ {0, 1},
|ψ(x, s)〉 = √1− ǫ |0〉 + (−1)s√ǫ |x+ 1〉.
These states provide the best trade-off between how much information they reveal, and how much cheating
in commitment they allow.
The protocol Pn, n ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . .}, goes as follows. Alice picks a ∈R {0, 1}, and Bob picks b ∈R {0, 1}.
Then they alternately send each other, for a total of n rounds, the states |ψ(a, s)〉 and |ψ(b, s)〉 respectively,
for independently chosen random sign s, starting with Alice. The last player to receive such a state then
reveals the bit he/she chose, followed by the other player. Then, they reveal the signs used in their states
in the opposite order, and the other party checks the state he/she received against the claimed bit and
sign. If no cheating is detected, the players declare the c = a⊕ b as the result of the protocol.
More formally,
1. For i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , n, if i is odd, Alice picks si ∈R {0, 1}, and sends |ψ(a, si)〉 to Bob, else, if i is even,
Bob picks si ∈R {0, 1}, and sends |ψ(b, si)〉 to Alice.
2. If n is even, Alice sends a to Bob, and then Bob sends b to Alice. Otherwise, if n is even they reveal
their bits in the opposite order.
3. For i = n, n− 1, n− 2, . . . , 1, the player that picked si reveals it to the other player. In other words,
the “signs” used in the states are revealed in the opposite order: If i is odd, Alice sends si to Bob,
else Bob sends si to Alice. The player that receives this bit checks via a measurement that the state
sent to her/him in the i-th round of the protocol is indeed consistent with the bit and the sign that
the other player sent.
Note that the order of revealing signs is designed so that the na¨ıve strategy of reusing a state that a
player got in a previous round does not work.
4. If all the checks are passed, the outcome of the protocol is c = a⊕ b.
Before we give cheating strategies for these protocols, we analyse general versions of P1 and P2. This
illustrates the main approach taken in the strategies for Pn, n ≥ 3.
3.1 The three-round version
We start by analysing the protocol P1 with one round of commitment. This happens to be a parametrised
version of the three-round protocol due to Ambainis [2]. We prove a property of this protocol that helps
us analyse protocols with more rounds.
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The protocol may be described with a parameter α ∈ [0, π] (such that tan α2 =
√
ǫ
1−ǫ ) as:
1. Alice picks a, s ∈R {0, 1}, and sends Bob the state |ψa,s〉, where the state is defined as follows:
|ψa,s〉 = cos α
2
|0〉+ (−1)s sin α
2
|a+ 1〉. (1)
2. Bob picks b ∈R {0, 1} and sends it to Alice.
3. Alice then reveals the bits a, s to Bob, who checks for consistency with the state initially sent by
Alice.
The output of the protocol is given by c = a⊕ b, if all the checks are passed.
Lemma 3.1 If Bob is honest, then Pr(c = 0) ≤ 14(3 + cosα).
Proof: The analysis proceeds as in [2], by symmetrising the strategy of a dishonest Alice, so that in the
last round, she sends s = 0 and s = 1 with equal probability, and assuming that she always sends a = b
(this only increases her chances of cheating successfully). For such a symmetric strategy, Ambainis [2,
Lemma 8] shows that
Pr(c = 0) ≤ F (ρ0, ρ) + F (ρ1, ρ)
2
, (2)
where ρ is the state of Bob after the first round, and ρ0, ρ1 are the analogous states corresponding to b = 0, 1
respectively, if Alice were honest:
ρa =
1
2
(|ψa,0〉〈ψa,0|+ |ψa,1〉〈ψa,1|),
and F (σ0, σ1) =
∥∥√σ0√σ1 ∥∥2tr denotes the fidelity of two density matrices [7].
We show in Lemma 3.2 below that the expression in equation (2) is bounded above by
1
2
(1 + F (ρ0, ρ1)
1/2).
Since F (ρ0, ρ1) = cos
4 α
2 , the bound follows.
We now prove the lemma mentioned above.
Lemma 3.2 For any two density matrices σ0, σ1,
max
σ
F (σ0, σ) + F (σ1, σ) ≤ 1 + F (σ0, σ1)1/2.
Proof: Let σ be the density matrix that achieves the maximum, and let |φx〉 be a purification of σx,
for x = 0, 1. Let |ξx〉 be the purification of σ that achieves maximum fidelity with σx [7]:
F (σ0, σ) = |〈φx|ξx〉|2 .
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Since |ξ0〉, |ξ1〉 are the purifications of the same density matrix σ, there is a local unitary operator U such
that |ξ1〉 = U |ξ0〉. Now,
F (σ0, σ) + F (σ1, σ) = |〈φ0|ξ0〉|2 + |〈φ1|ξ1〉|2
= |〈φ0|ξ0〉|2 + |〈φ1|U |ξ0〉|2
≤ max
|ξ〉
|〈φ0|ξ〉|2 + |〈φ1|U |ξ〉|2
= 1 + |〈φ1|U |φ0〉| (3)
≤ 1 + max
local U
|〈φ1|U |φ0〉|
= 1 + F (σ0, σ1)
1/2. (4)
Equation (3) above follows by noticing that the state |ξ〉 that achieves the maximum is the vector that
bisects the angle between |φ0〉 and U |φ1〉. Another way of getting the bound is by noticing that the
expression is the maximum eigenvalue of the matrix |φ0〉〈φ0|+U |φ1〉〈φ1|U †. The last step—equation (4)—
follows from a characterisation of fidelity due to Jozsa [7].
3.2 The five-round protocol
Next, we give a tight analysis for a general five-round version of the protocol P2 described above. This
version of the protocol still does not improve over the bias of 1/4 achieved by the three-round protocol
of [2]. However, it suggests a better cheating strategy for the many-rounds version than the one given in
the proof of Theorem 2.2.
The version of the protocol P2 we consider has the following five rounds with honest players:
1. Alice picks a, s ∈R {0, 1}, and sends Bob the state |ψa,s〉, where the state is defined as follows:
|ψa,s〉 = cos α
2
|0〉+ (−1)s sin α
2
|a+ 1〉, (5)
for an angle α to be specified later.
2. Similarly, Bob picks b, s′ ∈R {0, 1} and sends Alice the state |φb,s′〉, where the state is defined as
follows:
|φb,s′〉 = cos β
2
|0〉+ (−1)s′ sin β
2
|b+ 1〉, (6)
for an angle β to be specified later.
3. Alice then reveals the bit a to Bob.
4. Bob reveals both b and s′ to Alice, and Alice verifies, by an appropriate measurement, that the state
sent by Bob is consistent with b, s′.
5. Alice now discloses s as well, and Bob verifies that the state sent by Alice in the first round is
consistent with a, s.
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The output of the protocol, the coin flip c, is given by the exclusive-or of two bits, c = a⊕ b (provided no
cheating is detected).
In the case the players are honest, Pr(c = 0) = Pr(c = 1) = 1/2. Below we prove an upper bound on the
probability that any player can achieve (by deviating from the protocol) for an outcome of their choice. In
the following discussion, we will assume, w.l.o.g., that a dishonest player prefers the outcome c = 0.
First, we prove a bound on the probability that a dishonest Bob can achieve, provided Alice is honest.
Lemma 3.3 If Alice is honest, then Pr(c = 0) ≤ 1− 12 cos2 α2 sin2 β2 .
Proof: We claim that Bob’s optimal cheating strategy is to measure the state received from Alice in the
standard basis, and then commit to a state according to the outcome. If he observes |1〉 or |2〉, he can
cheat with probability 1 in the rest of the protocol. In case he observes |0〉, his probability of cheating
successfully is bounded by a constant less than one. This gives us the bound, as explained below.
Note that the last round is of no consequence to Bob’s cheating strategy, and we may trace the sign bit s out
after Alice sends the first message (and eliminate the last round). The protocol then becomes equivalent
to one in which the first round takes the following form:
Alice picks b ∈R {0, 1}, and sends |0〉 with probability cos2 α2 , and |b+ 1〉 with probability sin2 α2 .
This reduces the protocol to a convex combination of two protocols, with weights cos2 α2 and sin
2 α
2 . In the
first protocol, the first message is the same regardless of the value of b, and in the second, the first message
reveals b entirely.
In the first case, the protocol reduces to a three-round protocol of the type studied in Section 3.1, with the
role of Alice and Bob reversed. We may now use Lemma 3.1 to bound the probability that Bob can cheat
by (3 + cos β)/4.
In the second case, the protocol becomes trivial, and Bob can cheat with probability 1.
The probability of convincing Alice that c = 0 is thus bounded by
3 + cos β
4
cos2
α
2
+ sin2
α
2
,
which reduces to the bound we seek.
Bob can easily achieve the probability bound stated in the lemma, by following a cheating strategy as in [2,
Lemma 10]. This shows that the analysis in our proof is optimal.
We now turn to the case where Alice is dishonest. The following lemma bounds Alice’s cheating probability.
Lemma 3.4 If Bob is honest, then Pr(c = 0) ≤ 12(1 + cos2 α2 sin2 β2 ).
Proof: If Alice is dishonest, she tries to force the outcome c = 0 by guessing the bit that Bob picked,
and then convincing him that the state she sent is consistent with that guess.
We begin by symmetrising Alice’s strategy so that the density matrix of the qutrit she commits to in the
first round is diagonal in the 0, 1, 2 basis. This is done in a manner as in in [2, Lemma 6]; we omit the
details. We may therefore assume, w.l.o.g., that the joint state of Alice and Bob after the communication
in the first round is
|ξ〉 =
√
λ0 |0, 0〉 +
√
λ1 |1, 1〉 +
√
λ2 |2, 2〉,
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where
∑
i λi = 1 and the density matrix of Bob’s part is
ρ = λ0 |0〉〈0| + λ1 |1〉〈1| + λ2 |2〉〈2|.
Alice’s strategy in the third round is given by some measurement on her entangled qutrit, the qutrit sent
by Bob, and some ancilla. This measurement gives the value of the bit she sends to Bob in that round.
We consider the superoperator T acting on their joint state consisting of this measurement, composed with
the tracing out of all subsystems except the bit sent in that round, and the qutrit sent in the first round.
This superoperator is determined entirely by its action on |i〉〈i| ⊗ |ξ〉〈ξ|, for i = 0, 1, 2, since the qutrit sent
by Bob is a mixture of the states |i〉〈i|. Let
T (|i〉〈i| ⊗ |ξ〉〈ξ|) = |0〉〈0| ⊗ ρi0 + |1〉〈1| ⊗ ρi1,
where
∑
j ρij = ρ. Thus, the unnormalised density matrix of the qutrit Alice sent in the first round is:
cos2
β
2
ρ0b + sin
2 β
2
ρb+1,b, (7)
given that Bob had picked bit b, and Alice’s guessed it correctly: a = b.
Let ρ˜ij be the state, diagonal in the 0, 1, 2 basis, obtained by measuring the state ρij, and let:
ρ˜00 = diag(µ0, µ1, λ2 − µ2)
ρ˜01 = diag(λ0 − µ0, λ1 − µ1, µ2),
where 0 ≤ µi ≤ λi. Finally, let ρ˜b = cos2 β2 ρ˜0b + sin2 β2 ρ˜b+1,b be the state (7) measured in the 0, 1, 2
basis. Let σb be the density matrix of the qutrit Alice would send in the first round, if she were honest,
and had picked the bit b:
σb = cos
2 α
2
|0〉〈0| + sin2 α
2
|b+ 1〉〈b+ 1|.
Assume now that instead of having picked s′ at random, Bob had created a uniform superposition over
the two possible values for the sign bit, and that he sends the qubit containing s′ in the fourth round. It
is now not hard to prove (cf. [2]) that the probability that (the dishonest) Alice is able to convince Bob
that the state she sent is consistent with b, is at most F (ρ˜b, σb). This probability is thus also bounded
by F (σ˜b, σb), where
σ˜0 = cos
2 β
2
(µ0 |0〉〈0| + λ1 |1〉〈1|) + sin2 β
2
ρ˜
σ˜1 = cos
2 β
2
((λ0 − µ0) |0〉〈0| + λ2 |2〉〈2|) + sin2 β
2
ρ˜.
In other words, it only helps Alice to claim that she sent a state corresponding to bit b if she either sees b+1
in the qutrit she receives from Bob, or if she sees 0 and had sent the state |b+1〉 to Bob in the first round.
By optimising over the choice of µ0 for fixed λi and then optimising λi, we see that the optimum
of F (σ˜0, σ0) + F (σ˜1, σ1) is achieved when
µ0 =
λ0(λ1 − λ2 sin2 β2 )
(λ1 + λ2) cos2
β
2
,
λ1 ≥ λ2 sin2 β
2
, and
λ2 ≥ λ1 sin2 β
2
.
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We thus get the following bound on Alice’s cheating probability:
1
2
(1 + cos2
α
2
sin2
β
2
),
which is the bound claimed.
Next, we describe a cheating strategy for Alice that achieves the outcome of her choice with probability as
high as in the upper bound above, showing that our analysis is optimal.
Lemma 3.5 If Bob is honest, Alice can achieve Pr(c = 0) ≥ 12 (1 + cos2 α2 sin2 β2 ).
Proof: Alice constructs the following entangled state and sends one half of it to Bob in the first round:
|ξ〉 =
√
1− λ|0, 0〉 +
√
λ
2
|1, 1〉 +
√
λ
2
|2, 2〉, where
λ =
sin2 α2
(1 + sin2 β2 ) cos
2 α
2 + sin
2 α
2
,
and so the density matrix of the qutrit with Bob is ρ = diag(1− λ, λ/2, λ/2) in the 0, 1, 2 basis.
After Alice receives a qutrit from Bob in the second round, she applies a unitary transformation to “guess”
a value for b to maximise her chances of getting c = 0. This transformation acts on the qutrit she received
from Bob, her entangled qutrit from the first round, and an ancilla qubit. It can be written as:
|0〉〈0| ⊗ (|0〉〈0| ⊗H + |1〉〈1| ⊗ I + |2〉〈2| ⊗ σx) + |1〉〈1| ⊗ I ⊗ I + |2〉〈2| ⊗ I ⊗ σx.
whereH is the Hadamard transform, and σx is the Pauli “bit flip” matrix. In other words, Alice guesses a =
b, if the qutrit from Bob reveals the identity of b. Otherwise, if she committed with a |d〉, (d = 1, 2) she
says a = d − 1, since this commitment is irrevokable. If she committed with |0〉, she says a = 0, 1 with
equal amplitude. It is crucial that she does this in superposition.
In the fourth round, Bob reveals the state of the qutrit he sent. If Alice sees that the bit Bob picked is
different from her guess, i.e. b 6= a, then she sends, say, s = 0 (an arbitrary value, since she has lost the
game). Otherwise, she tries to pick the best s possible to maximise her chance of passing Bob’s check. We
describe her actions when b = 0, s′ = 0; the other cases are similar.
The unnormalised density matrix of the qutrit she sent in the first round, when b = 0, s′ = 0, conditioned
on her reply being a = 0 is:
cos2
β
2
(
1− λ
2
|0〉〈0| + λ
2
|1〉〈1|
)
+ sin2
β
2
ρ.
Note that she knows the state of all their qubits, given b, s′, a. She can thus transform her part of the state
so that their joint state looks like√
1− λ
2
(1 + sin2
β
2
) |00〉 +
√
λ
2
|11〉 +
√
λ
2
sin
β
2
|22〉.
She sends s = 0 if the entangled bit is 2. If her entangled qutrit is not 2, she does a Hadamard transform
on her entangled qubit, and sends that to Bob as s. The probability with which Bob accepts a = b, s is
then 

√
1− λ
2
(1 + sin2
β
2
) cos
α
2
+
√
λ
2
sin
α
2


2
,
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which evaluates to the expression stated in the lemma. She can achieve the same probability of success for
all other values of b, s′ as well. Thus, the overall chance of her succeeding in cheating is also given by this
expression.
The properties we established above show that this protocol still has a bias of 1/4: the cheating probability
for Alice and Bob are of the form 12+δ and 1−δ respectively (with δ = 12 cos2 α2 sin2 β2 ), and their maximum
is minimised when δ = 1/4.
3.3 Cheating strategies for Pn
Let An(ǫ), Bn(ǫ) be the maximum value of Alice and Bob’s cheating probability in the protocol Pn, when
the other party is honest.
Bob’s optimal strategy may be reduced to a strategy for Alice as in the proof of Lemma 3.3. Alice always
starts the protocol, and also sends the last message. Since the last message does not affect Bob’s cheating
strategy, we may trace it out of the protocol when analysing his optimal strategy. The protocol Pn then
reduces to a mixture of protocols where Alice sends |0〉 in the first round with probability 1− ǫ (i.e. does
not reveal any information about the bit a), and sends |a + 1〉 with probability ǫ (i.e. completely reveals
the bit a). The rest of the protocol is the same as Pn−1 with the roles of Alice and Bob reversed. Thus,
Bn(ǫ) = ǫ+ (1− ǫ)An−1(ǫ), for n ≥ 2. (8)
We already know from [2] that B1(ǫ) = (1+ ǫ)/2. It thus suffices to analyse Alice’s cheating probability in
all the protocols Pn.
From our analysis of the three and five round protocols, we also know that
A1(ǫ) = 1− ǫ
2
B2(ǫ) = 1− ǫ
2
+
ǫ2
2
A2(ǫ) =
1
2
+
ǫ
2
− ǫ
2
2
.
We now give a lower bound for the probability An(ǫ) by describing a cheating strategy for Alice that
generalises the strategy that we saw in the five round protocol.
First, we assume n = 2k− 1 (k ≥ 1) is odd, so that Alice has k rounds of commitment, and Bob has k− 1.
The case of n even is addressed later. In the first round, Alice sends one half of the state
√
1− λ1 |00〉 +
√
λ1
2
|11〉 +
√
λ1
2
|22〉
to Bob, and retains the other half. The half she keeps is referred to as an “entangled qutrit” below. All the
parameters λj will be specified later. If one of the entangled qutrits she retains from any previous round
is in state x+ 1, in all the commitment rounds that follow, she sends the right half of the state
1√
2
|0〉|ψ(x, 0)〉 + 1√
2
|1〉|ψ(x, 1)〉
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and keeps the first qubit (called a “sign qubit” below). If the entangled qutrits are all 0, and at least one
of the qutrits she received in earlier rounds from Bob is in state b+ 1, then she sends the right half of the
state
1√
2
|0〉|ψ(b, 0)〉 + 1√
2
|1〉|ψ(b, 1)〉
to Bob. Otherwise, if none of the above two events occurs, she sends one half of the state
√
1− λj |00〉 +
√
λj
2
|11〉 +
√
λj
2
|22〉
in the j-th commitment round. It is important that she do all this “in superposition,” i.e., via unitary
operations controlled by her entangled qutrits and the qutrits she receives from Bob. She performs no
measurements in the process.
Formally, for each qutrit that Alice is supposed to send, she has a qutrit-qubit pair. The first serves as the
“entangled qutrit”, and the second serves as the “sign qubit”. They are all initialised to the 0 state. She
prepares appropriate states over these according to the above rules, as the protocol proceeds. The joint
state of both parties together after the n commitment rounds then looks as given below, for an arbitrary
choice of b and the signs {s2j} picked by Bob. Here, the qutrits sent by Alice to Bob are underlined. The
entangled qutrits and sign bits can be identified from the context. The first two lines correspond to the
part of the state where Alice commits to a bit x by sending |x+1〉, before she can identify which bit b Bob
has picked. The next two lines have the part of the state where Alice has not committed to any bit, and
sees a |b + 1〉 in one of the qutrits Bob sent. The last term is the remaining part of the state. Note that
Alice can differentiate between these three parts by examining her entangled qutrits and the qutrits Bob
sent her. The odd lines contain the portion of the state constructed by Alice, and the even lines contain
the portion prepared by Bob (and sent to Alice).
∑
x=0,1
k−1∑
j=1

j−1⊗
l=1
√
1− λl |00〉

⊗
√
λj
2
|x+ 1, x+ 1〉 ⊗
[
1√
2
(|0〉|ψ(x, 0)〉+ |1〉|ψ(x, 1)〉)
]k−j
⊗(√
1− ǫ |0〉
)j−1 ⊗

k−1⊗
l=j
|ψ(b, s2l)〉


+
k−1∑
j=1

 j⊗
l=1
√
1− λl |00〉

⊗ [ 1√
2
(|0〉|ψ(b, 0)〉+ |1〉|ψ(b, 1)〉)
]k−j
(9)
⊗(√
1− ǫ |0〉
)j−1 ⊗ [(−1)s2j√ǫ |b+ 1〉]⊗

 k−1⊗
l=j+1
|ψ(b, s2l)〉


+
[
k−1⊗
l=1
√
1− λl |00〉
]
⊗

√1− λk |00〉+
√
λk
2
|11〉+
√
λk
2
|22〉


⊗(√
1− ǫ |0〉
)k−1
.
Since n = 2k − 1 is odd, Bob reveals his bit b first. W.l.o.g., we may assume that Alice would like to
bias the coin towards 0. She therefore sends a = b in the part of her state where her entangled qutrit is
not equal to b¯ + 1 (which corresponds to a commitment which she cannot change). We will consider the
residual state after Alice has sent back k − i signs, in reverse order. This is the unnormalised part of the
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state (9) that has not been rejected by Bob. We will prove by induction that Alice can locally transform
the residual state to a state |φi〉 after every two rounds of sign exchange. This state is similar in form to
the joint state (9) above, except that the first part is projected onto the space where x = b, and there is a
factor of µi in the last term. The state |φi〉 is displayed below:
i−1∑
j=1

j−1⊗
l=1
√
1− λl |00〉

⊗
√
λj
2
|b+ 1, b+ 1〉 ⊗
[
1√
2
(|0〉|ψ(b, 0)〉+ |1〉|ψ(b, 1)〉)
]i−j
⊗(√
1− ǫ |0〉
)j−1 ⊗

i−1⊗
l=j
|ψ(b, s2l)〉


+
i−1∑
j=1

 j⊗
l=1
√
1− λl |00〉

⊗ [ 1√
2
(|0〉|ψ(b, 0)〉+ |1〉|ψ(b, 1)〉)
]i−j
(10)
⊗(√
1− ǫ |0〉
)j−1 ⊗ [(−1)s2j√ǫ |b+ 1〉]⊗

 i−1⊗
l=j+1
|ψ(b, s2l)〉


+
[
i−1⊗
l=1
√
1− λl |00〉
]
⊗

√µi(1− λi) |00〉+
√
λi
2
|b+ 1, b+ 1〉


⊗(√
1− ǫ |0〉
)i−1
,
where the numbers µi are as follows:
µk = 1
µi−1 = (1− ǫ)2µi + ǫ
2
(3− ǫ). (11)
We can now also specify the parameters λi:
λi =
ǫ/2
µi(1− ǫ) + ǫ/2 . (12)
Clearly, the state |φk〉, when none of the signs have been revealed by Alice is of this form, with µk = 1.
Assume that this is also the case for some i ≤ k. We will show by induction that the state after Alice has
revealed k− i+1 sign bits s2k−1, s2k−3, . . . , s2i−1 may be transformed to (10) and that equation (11) holds.
To send the sign s2i−1, Alice does the following. The sign in part of the state in the first two summations
of the state |φi〉 in equation (10)) is “pre-computed” (in the sign qubit). To compute the sign in the last
term, Alice first sets b + 1 to 1 in the i-th entangled qutrit, does a Hadamard transform, and exchanges
that entangled qubit with the i-th sign qubit. She then measures the i-th sign qubit, and sends it across.
It is easily seen that the unnormalised state that remains after Bob has checked the i-th qutrit sent by
Alice is as follows.2 Here, we have written the last terms of the first two summations in equation (10)
separately in lines 5 and 7 to facilitate the rest of the proof.
i−2∑
j=1

j−1⊗
l=1
√
1− λl |00〉

⊗
√
λj
2
|b+ 1, b+ 1〉 ⊗
[
1√
2
(|0〉|ψ(b, 0)〉+ |1〉|ψ(b, 1)〉)
]i−1−j
2 Actually, the state is a mixture of two states which are both 1/
√
2 times the state given. The mixture arises because of
the two possible values of the sign bit Alice sends for s2i−1. The mixture is of course equivalent to the single state shown.
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⊗(√
1− ǫ |0〉
)j−1 ⊗

i−1⊗
l=j
|ψ(b, s2l)〉


+
i−2∑
j=1

 j⊗
l=1
√
1− λl |00〉

⊗ [ 1√
2
(|0〉|ψ(b, 0)〉+ |1〉|ψ(b, 1)〉)
]i−1−j
⊗(√
1− ǫ |0〉
)j−1 ⊗ [(−1)s2j√ǫ |b+ 1〉]⊗

 i−1⊗
l=j+1
|ψ(b, s2l)〉


+
[
i−2⊗
l=1
√
1− λl |00〉
]
⊗


√
λi−1
2
|b+ 1, b+ 1〉


⊗(√
1− ǫ |0〉
)i−2 ⊗ |ψ(b, s2(i−1))〉
+
[
i−2⊗
l=1
√
1− λl |00〉
]
⊗
(√
1− λi−1 |00〉
)
⊗(√
1− ǫ |0〉
)i−2 ⊗ [(−1)s2(i−1)√ǫ |b+ 1〉]
+
[
i−2⊗
l=1
√
1− λl |00〉
]
⊗
(√
1− λi−1 |00〉
)
⊗(√
1− ǫ |0〉
)i−2 ⊗√1− ǫ |0〉(µi(1− ǫ) + ǫ/2)1/2
Now, when Bob sends the sign s2(i−1) to Alice, she rotates the (i − 1)-th qutrit that Bob sent her in all
but the last two terms in the sum above, to |0〉. She also rotates that qutrit in the last two terms from
(µi(1− ǫ) + ǫ/2)1/2
√
1− ǫ |0〉 + (−1)s2(i−1)√ǫ |b+ 1〉
to
√
µi−1|0〉, whereby µi−1 = µi(1− ǫ)2 + ǫ(1− ǫ)/2 + ǫ. This proves the induction step.
At the final round of the protocol Pn, the state that they are left with is
√
µ1(1− λ1) |00〉 +
√
λ1
2
|b+ 1, b+ 1〉.
Following Alice’s strategy for computing the sign as above, we see that the probability with which Alice
succeeds in passing Bob’s checks is (using equation (12))(√
µ1(1− λ1)(1− ǫ) +
√
λ1ǫ/2
)2
= µ1(1 − ǫ) + ǫ/2. (13)
Solving the recurrence for µi given in equation (11), we get
µi = (1− ǫ)2(k−i) + (3− ǫ)
2(2 − ǫ)(1− (1− ǫ)
2(k−i)),
and so that from equation (13),
For n odd, An(ǫ) ≥ ǫ
2
+ (1− ǫ)n + (3− ǫ)(1− ǫ)
2(2− ǫ) (1− (1− ǫ)
n−1)
=
1
2(2 − ǫ)(3− 2ǫ+ (1− ǫ)
n+1). (14)
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The analysis in the case that n = 2k is even is similar, except for the rule Alice uses to compute the bit
she sends to Bob (since she is supposed to reveal her bit before Bob reveals his bit). In this case, she sends
the bit x if any of her entangled qutrits is in state |x + 1〉. Else, if any of Bob’s qutrits is in state b + 1,
she sends b. In the remaining case, she sends 0, 1 with equal amplitude 1/
√
2. This leads to a state similar
to |φk〉 above after Bob reveals his bit, and the last sign he used, except that here µk = (1 + ǫ)/2. So, we
get:
For n even, An(ǫ) ≥ ǫ
2
+ (1− ǫ)n−1(1 + ǫ)/2 + (3− ǫ)(1− ǫ)
2(2 − ǫ) (1− (1− ǫ)
n−2))
=
1
2(2− ǫ) (3− 2ǫ− (1− ǫ)
n+1). (15)
From equations (14), (15), and (8), we can deduce lower bounds for Bn(ǫ) as well, for n ≥ 2. This
expression matches the one for B1(ǫ). Thus,
For all n, Bn(ǫ) ≥ 1
2(2 − ǫ) (3− ǫ+ (−1)
n(1− ǫ)n+1). (16)
To determine the bias achieved, we examine the maximum of the cheating probabilities attained by Alice
and Bob. Note that An(ǫ) + Bn(ǫ) ≥ 3/2 for all n, ǫ. Thus, the bias of the protocol Pn is at least 3/4 for
any n and ǫ. Since we would like this bias to be as small as possible, we optimise the maximum cheating
probability with respect to ǫ.
For odd n, An(0) = Bn(1) = 1, and An(1) = B(0) = 1/2, An is monotonically decreasing, and Bn is
monotonically increasing with respect to ǫ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, the maximum bias achievable is minimised
when An(ǫ) = Bn(ǫ). This condition is satisfied when ǫ = ǫ0 such that
(1− ǫ0)n+1 = ǫ0
2
that is, (17)
ǫ0 =
1
n+ 1
(lnn− ln lnn+Θ(1)).
Using equation (17) we can verify that the lower bound on An(ǫ0) is 3/4.
For even n, An(0) = An(1) = 1/2, and B(0) = Bn(1) = 1, An is concave, Bn is convex, and Bn(ǫ) ≥ An(ǫ)
for ǫ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, the bias achievable is minimised when Bn is, i.e., for ǫ = ǫ0 such that
(1− ǫ0)n = 1
(2− ǫ0)n+ 1 that is, (18)
ǫ0 =
1
n
ln(2n − lnn+Θ(1)).
The expression for the cheating probability Bn(ǫ0) then evaluates to at least
3
4 , as may be seen by using
equation (18).
This completes the analysis of the cheating strategies devised above.
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